



Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress

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Summary

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended and regularly extended, provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and foreign maritime security forces for counterterrorism operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Thus far, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism (CT) support. In FY2010, Section 1206 funds were also used to provide significant assistance to train and equip foreign military forces for military and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate.

Section 1206 allocations for FY2006-FY2009 and congressionally notified plans for FY2010 total over \$1.3 billion. FY2011 plans are still under consideration.

Through the use of over \$1.3 billion in FY2006 through FY2010 funds, Section 1206 supported bilateral programs in 34 countries, 14 multilateral programs, and a global human rights program. Just over 40% of the nearly \$1 billion in FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 funding was obligated for three countries: Lebanon, Pakistan, and Yemen. For FY2010, Section 1206 provides \$340.6 million in support for bilateral programs in 18 countries and one multilateral program for seven recipients (including three receiving bilateral aid). The three largest recipients in FY2010 were Lebanon (\$23.0 million), the Philippines (\$27.7 million), and Yemen (\$155.3 million). In greater Europe, 13 states received about \$74 million in FY2010 aid to support their deployments to Afghanistan, with Georgia receiving \$20 million of that assistance.

Some Members are concerned with several issues related to Section 1206 authority, both narrow and broad. Specific current concerns include whether Section 1206 funds are being used appropriately and effectively, and whether the authority should be expanded to provide training not only military forces but also to a wide range of foreign security forces. (Currently, Section 1206 limits security force training to maritime security forces.) An overarching issue is whether Congress should place Section 1206 train and equip (T&E) authority under the State Department with other T&E authorities. (Members have thus far refrained from codifying Section 1206 in permanent law, as requested by DOD.) A related issue is whether Congress should grant the State Department its own security assistance contingency fund with purposes that overlap Section 1206, as provided in the House-passed FY2010-FY2011 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 2410, Section 841). Finally, as the Obama Administration conducts an overall assessment of foreign assistance, including security assistance, some Members may wish to examine the status of Section 1206 in the context of broader security assistance reform.

In its FY2012 budget request, presented February 14, the Obama Administration asks for \$500 million in Section 1206 funding. (For Congress to appropriate this amount, the authorization ceiling would have to be raised.) In addition to its Section 1206 request, the Obama Administration asks for a \$50 million appropriation in each of the DOD and the State Department budgets, and a new \$450 million DOD transfer authority, to fund a new three-year pilot project: a joint DOD-State Global Security Contingency Fund. The stated purposes of this fund seem to overlap with Section 1206 purposes.

This report will be updated as warranted.

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Among the issues related to U.S. assistance to foreign military and security forces, one of the most salient for the 112th Congress may be the status of Section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 109-163, as amended. This authority, enacted in 2005, provides the Secretary of Defense with a new authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces for specified purposes:

- To enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. (Nearly all Section 1206 assistance from FY2006 to FY2009 was for CT training and equipment.)
- To enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. (A significant portion of FY2010 funds is being provided for such assistance.)

Section 1206 is the first major DOD authority to be used expressly for the purpose of training and equipping the national military forces of foreign countries. For almost the past half-century, DOD generally has trained and equipped foreign military forces under State Department Title 22 authority and through State Department programs. On occasion, Congress has given DOD authority to train and equip specified countries, and over the years Congress has provided DOD with specific Title 10 authorities or DOD funding to provide foreign military forces with opportunities to attend military schools, but Section 1206 is the first DOD global train-and-equip authority since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which placed oversight for military assistance with the Secretary of State.

Congress's decision to grant DOD Section 1206 authority has been controversial. Some Members have stressed the need for a DOD authority that combatant commanders can use to respond to emerging threats that put the well-being of U.S. military personnel at risk or might eventually require robust, and costly, U.S. military action. But others have questioned whether Section 1206 funds are being used appropriately and effectively, and, above all, whether providing DOD with its own train-and-equip (T&E) authorities undermines the Secretary of State's statutory responsibility to ensure coherence of U.S. foreign policy.

While no other single DOD security assistance authority has generated as much controversy as Section 1206, some analysts have been concerned with the addition of a few new DOD security assistance authorities after the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks on the United States, as well as the perceived expansion of pre-9/11 DOD security assistance and other foreign assistance-type activities. Of particular concern to some Members is Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, an authorization to provide support to "foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals" that assist or facilitate U.S. military operations conducted by special operations forces (SOF) to combat terrorism.¹ Two other post 9/11 security assistance authorities of concern are the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which funds foreign military officers and defense and security officials to attend U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, and conferences and later made permanent law, and the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), which funds countries assisting in U.S. military operations. The former is viewed by some analysts as

¹ This authority was established by Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, P.L. 108-375, entitled Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism, and is often referred to as "Section 1208" authority. The initial authorization was extended and amended several times. The authority is now in effect through FY2013. Amendments raised the spending limit from \$25 million to \$40 million, added a requirement for Chief of Mission concurrence (Section 1208, FY2009 NDAA, P.L. 110-417), and subjected the authority to more detailed reporting requirements (Section 1202, FY2010 NDAA, P.L. 111-84). Information concerning this program is classified.

overlapping with the State Department International Military and Education Training (IMET) program, the latter is viewed as performing the same function as the State Department Economic Support Fund (ESF).² Because of these overlapping functions, divided between agencies, some analysts judge that U.S. government-wide security assistance funding and programs are not sufficiently coordinated at all levels (strategy-making, planning, and implementation). Some argue that greater coherence could be achieved if Congress created an interagency funding mechanism, perhaps along the lines of the DOD, State Department, and USAID pooled fund for security and other assistance proposed in the December 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).³

This report provides background on the pre-Section 1206 status of security assistance authorities and the factors contributing to the enactment of Section 1206. It then sets out the purposes of the legislation and scope of its activities, restrictions on its use, the DOD-State Department planning process, and funding. It concludes with a discussion of issues for Congress. An appendix provides a descriptive legislative history of the bill and evolving congressional committee attitudes towards the appropriate division of labor between the Department of Defense and the State Department regarding Section 1206 authority.

Background

For nearly 50 years, since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), the Secretary of State has exercised the leadership role for foreign assistance, including military assistance, specifically military education and training.⁴ With the exception of a period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s inclusive of the Vietnam War, major foreign military assistance programs have been carried out under State Department authority, oversight and guidance,⁵ with a DOD agency responsible for implementation.⁶ "Traditionally the State

² Other DOD foreign assistance-type accounts of concern are two post-9/11 authorities, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), used by military commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines for small-scale humanitarian or development projects, and the Security and Stabilization fund ("Section 1207") through which DOD transfers funds to the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction activities, mostly outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

³ Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, *The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, December 2010, p. 203. Hereafter referred to as QDDR.

⁴ As now stated in the FAA of 1961, as amended, Section 622(c) (22 U.S.C. 2382) states that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, "shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby."

⁵ Before the FAA, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373) created a Mutual Security Agency in the Executive Office of the President, whose Director was responsible for the "continuous supervision, general direction, and coordination of all foreign aid—military, economic, and technical assistance." U.S. Congress, House. *U.S. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration and Related Information*, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. 86th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 116, Washington: USGPO, June 11, 1959, p. 69. During part of the 1950s, DOD administered the military assistance programs under the White House's policy direction and guidance. Congress subsequently moved responsibility for non-military aid to the State Department (P.L. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714). Two lower-ranking State Department officials were charged (consecutively) with coordinating with DOD regarding military aid before the responsibility was finally bestowed on the Secretary of State. For more detail on the further evolution of Military Assistance Authority, see CRS Report RL34639, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress*, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.

Department plans, budgets and oversees security assistance programs and is the lead agency in charge of all U.S. foreign policy and global engagement," according to a recent report co-sponsored by The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center. "The DOD has supported overall foreign and national security policy by implementing these programs. This relationship was designed to ensure that security assistance was aligned with general U.S. foreign policy goals."⁷

For many years, DOD had little interest in security assistance activities, as they were regarded neither as a military mission nor as an activity of more than marginal value to ensuring national security. In particular, training foreign military forces was not considered a task for general purpose military forces, and until recently limited training was most often conducted by U.S. SOF, often under State Department authority.⁸

DOD perspectives on training foreign military forces slowly began to change after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Defense officials began to regard the defeat of terrorist groups in the countries where they train and prepare as essential to U.S. national security. But some realized that these groups could not be disrupted and defeated solely with U.S. forces employed under existing U.S. arrangements. U.S. military forces lacked the language, country knowledge and cultural sensitivity to conduct effective counterterrorist (CT) activities in many countries where threats could be expected to emerge. Some DOD officials realized that foreign military and security forces would have to take the lead in conducting such activities, and would need training to assume that role. At the same time, DOD officials considered the State Department as lacking the necessary expertise and capabilities to carry out an effective counterterrorism program. DOD officials also viewed the State Department's planning and implementation processes under authorities for traditional T&E programs⁹ as too slow and cumbersome to meet emerging threats.

In the mid-2000s, DOD officials developed a proposal for a "Global Train and Equip" authority to increase U.S. support for foreign military and security forces in order to disrupt terrorist networks, to build the capacity of legitimate states to provide security within their sovereign territory to prevent terrorists from establishing footholds, and to build the capacity of legitimate states to participate in U.N., regional, and U.S. coalition military missions. This proposal called

(...continued)

⁶ The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), under the DOD Under Secretary for Policy, and its predecessor agency. While the original language in 1961 applied specifically to assistance authorized under the FAA, a 1976 amendment deleted this restriction.

⁷ The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness*, Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, Project Chairman, October 2008, p. 22. Hereafter referred to as *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*.

⁸ Special Operations Forces also train together with foreign troops under a DOD authority, Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2011, Special Operations Forces: training with friendly foreign forces. The primary purpose of the Joint Combined Exchange Training program, conducted under this authority, is to provide training for the U.S. forces.

⁹ State Department programs under which foreign military forces are trained are the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programs. Equipment is provided to foreign governments through the State Department Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) programs. According to DOD, this "traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept to execution," while "Global Train and Equip authority allows a response to emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less." U.S. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification*, February 4, 2008, p. 103. Hereafter referred to as *FY2009 DOD Summary Justification*. In practice, however, the time frame for a Section 1206 response is sometimes considerably longer than six months; see the section below on "Timeliness."

for a DOD lead, but also required State Department concurrence. Although this proposal was initially resisted by certain sectors at both DOD and the State Department, it won the support of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and the enthusiastic endorsement of geographic Combatant Commanders, according to one DOD official who promoted the legislation.¹⁰

At the same time, perspectives on the use of U.S. military forces to train foreign military forces began to evolve. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has asserted that training foreign forces is a military mission for U.S. general purpose forces.¹¹

In early 2005, DOD requested, and Congress granted, Section 1206 as a special contingency authority. Nevertheless, the armed services committees repeatedly expressed hesitation about conceding this authority to DOD and cautioned that it was to be regarded as a pilot program. (See the **Appendix** for a legislative history of Section 1206, FY2006-FY2009.)

In April 2008 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that still stands as the DOD position on Section 1206, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described this authority as “a means to fill longstanding gaps in an effort to help other nations build and sustain capable military forces ...” Explaining DOD’s need to carry out such activities, Secretary Gates stated that after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), “building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement” for DOD to fulfill its national security mission. The “security of America’s partners is essential to America’s own security,” according to Gates, and Section 1206 is a preventive tool through which the United States helps allies and partners to “confront extremists and other potential sources of global instability within their borders ... before festering problems and threats become crises requiring U.S. military intervention.” At the same time, Secretary Gates dismissed the idea that Section 1206 duplicates or could be viewed as a substitute for State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs. (However, other government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs. See the section below entitled “Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Effectively?”)

The Obama Administration has opted to continue the program begun under the George W. Bush Administration. According to the Administration’s FY2010 Budget Request Summary Justification Document accompanying DOD’s May 2009 budget request, U.S. Combatant Commanders consider this the Section 1206 program “the single most important tool for the Department to shape the environment and counter terrorism.”¹² According to that document, the Section 1206 program is important because it allows the United States to train and equip foreign military forces to respond to “urgent and emergent threats,” and because it “provides opportunities to solve problems before they become crises....”¹³

¹⁰ Jeffrey (Jeb) Nadaner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations.

¹¹ See, for instance: Robert M. Gates. *A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age*. Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009. In this article, Gates worries that the military personnel and promotions system is not able “to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops—something still not considered a career-enhancing path for the best and brightest officers.”

¹² U.S. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification*, May 2009, pp. 1-13.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Section 1206 in Action

Purpose, Scope, and Timeline of Current Activities

As noted above, Congress provided Section 1206 authority for two purposes. One is to enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. The other is to enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. Despite Section 1206's dual purpose, through FY2009, nearly all Section 1206 funding has been used to provide counterterrorism equipment and related training. The types of equipment provided include radios and communications systems; surveillance and reconnaissance systems; trucks, ambulances, boats, and other vehicles; small arms and rifles; night vision goggles and sights; and clothing.

Through the use of FY2006 through FY2010 funds, Section 1206 supported bilateral programs in 34 countries and 14 multilateral programs. The multilateral programs have included 2 to 15 countries. In addition, a DOD organization, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS), has been provided funds for training foreign troops in human rights and respect for civilian authority. The cost for bilateral and multilateral projects has ranged from \$40,000 to over \$80 million, with most between \$1 million and \$15 million. (See **Table 1** and **Table 2**, below.)

For FY2010, Section 1206 provided \$340.6 million in support for bilateral programs in 18 countries and one multilateral program with seven recipients (including three which also received bilateral aid). Yemen received nearly half the FY2010 assistance (\$155.3 million). The two next largest FY2010 recipients—Lebanon (\$23.0 million) and the Philippines (\$27.7 million)—received about 15%. Over a fifth of FY2010 funds (about \$74 million) were used to train and equip military forces from greater Europe for their deployment to Afghanistan, with nine countries receiving bilateral assistance and seven countries (three of which also receive bilateral aid) receiving assistance as a group. The largest of these recipients was Georgia (\$20.5 million). (See **Table 2**, below.)

Although a primary rationale for Section 1206 funding was that it would enable the U.S. government to respond more quickly to emerging needs than possible under the FMF process, the delivery of Section 1206 equipment has not always proved as expeditious as originally expected. Although DOD stated in a FY2009 budget request document that Section 1206 authority "allows a response to urgent and emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less,"¹⁴ the actual delivery time for much equipment can be longer. A January 2009 DOD letter to certain Members of Congress states that "Section 1206 authority can provide training and equipment in one to two years, or less."¹⁵ State Department officials attribute the lag on some cases to multiple causes, most importantly the shortage of readily available equipment in many cases due to the small number of U.S. producers. Some analysts also have cited processing delays at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) as a factor.¹⁶

¹⁴ FY 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, p. 103.

¹⁵ A copy of the letter was provided by DOD, with the permission of a congressional recipient. It is signed by the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric S Edelman, who occupied that post as of the date of the letter, January 16, 2009. Hereafter referred to as *OSD letter of January 16, 2009 responding to Members of Congress*.

¹⁶ The DSCA is a defense agency (under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) that administers and implements a wide variety of security assistance programs, including Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, (continued...)

Section 1206 Recipients

The \$1.3 billion in FY2006-FY2010 Section 1206 funding has been divided among over 34 bilateral recipients and 14 multilateral groups of 2-15 members. Of these, three—Yemen, Pakistan, and Lebanon—have received 44% of total Section 1206 assistance for these years. The top seven recipients (i.e., the top three recipients plus the Philippines, Indonesia, Bahrain, and Malaysia) receive 63%, or a bit short of two-thirds of total Section 1206 funding. These seven countries constitute one-fifth of all bilateral recipients. Over half the bilateral and multilateral recipients receive under \$15 million in Section 1206 assistance.

Yemen has been the largest recipient. The \$252.6 million it received from FY2006 through FY2010 constitutes almost a fifth of total Section 1206 funding to date. Over 60% of Section 1206 assistance to Yemen thus far was provided with FY2010 funds, most used to provide small airplanes and helicopters and other aircraft support to the Yemeni air force, to enable it to support Yemeni CT units, and the rest to enhance the CT capability of Yemeni SOF.

Over a quarter of Section 1206 aid to Yemen was provided through FY2009 funding. This assistance included not only trucks, radio systems (with operation and maintenance training), and body armor to help the Yemeni Border Security Force deter, detect, and detain terrorists along the Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman borders, but also equipment for the Yemeni Coast Guard (patrol boats and accessories, and shipboard radios) and for the Yemeni Air Force (helicopter spare parts and surveillance cameras) to enhance CT capability. FY2009 funds also supported Yemen's Ministry of Defense with an explosive ordnance disposal program. Section 1206 assistance to Yemen started in FY2006 with a relatively small package of equipment (small arms and ammunition, computers, radios and their installation, and light tactical vehicles) to aid the Yemeni Armed Forces in preventing cross-border arms trafficking. Significantly more FY2007 funds, about 10% of the current total, were devoted to enhance Yemen's border security CT capability, with vehicles of various types (as well as maintenance training and support), spare parts, crisis action center equipment, and transportation

Pakistan, the second-largest recipient with \$203.4 million, or about 15% of total Section 1206 funding, did not receive funds in FY2010. Some \$113.5 million, or over half Pakistan's funding, was provided in FY2009. Most Section 1206 funding to Pakistan has provided equipment and training to increase the government's ability to counter terrorism threats emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

- A central feature has been helicopter support. In FY2006, Section 1206 assistance was first used to address spare part shortages that limited availability from Pakistan's "impressive inventory of helicopters."¹⁷ These funds provided spare parts for Mi-17 and Cobra helicopters, as well as aviation body armor, night vision goggles, and limited visibility training for pilots. FY2008 and FY2009 funds also have provided the means, technical support,

(...continued)

International Military Education and Training, Excess Defense Articles, and drawdowns, as well as Section 1206. More information on the DSCA is available at <http://www.dsca.mil>.

¹⁷ CNA Corporation, *Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries: Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, Sao Tome and Principe*, by Eric Thompson and Patricio Asfura-Heim, CRM D0017988.A4/1Rev. July 2008, p. 25, <http://www.cna.org/documents/D0017988.A4.pdf>. Hereafter referred to as *CNA Corporation Assessments*.

and training to repair, maintain, shelter, and operate Pakistan's helicopters for use in FATA operations. FY2009 funds supply four Mi-17 helicopters and spare parts for use along Pakistan's western border.

- Support to Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG), a special forces unit, to operate more effectively in the FATA has included a variety of equipment in FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009. Equipment contracted during those fiscal years includes radios and other communications equipment, targeting systems, sniper rifles, ammunition, night vision goggles, global positioning systems units, lifesaver kits, body armor, and other field gear. In FY2007 it included training for conducting nighttime raids from helicopters (FY2007). In FY2008, equipment was also provided to the Pakistan Army Aviation 21st reaction squadron.
- Additional FY2009 aid includes support to build a ground-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability for counterterrorism operations to support Pakistan Army counterterrorism operations in the FATA, and kits to assist the Pakistan Army and Navy effectively investigate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other explosives used in terrorism operations.

Lebanon has received almost 10% of total Section 1206 funding.¹⁸ The \$128.5 million it has received has been disbursed over each of Section 1206's five funding years in amounts ranging from a low of \$10.5 million in FY2006 to a high of \$49.3 million in FY2009. Section 1206 assistance first focused on helping the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to bring order to southern Lebanon and secure the country's northern border in the wake of the July 2006 Israel strikes against Hizbullah in Lebanon. FY2006 assistance bought spare parts for trucks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. FY2007 assistance purchased trucks, secure communications equipment, vehicles and helicopter spare parts, spare parts for guns, and soldier equipment, including night vision goggles and body armor. FY2008 and FY2009 assistance focused on equipment for Lebanese. FY2008 items included secure communications equipment, as well as vehicles, night vision sights, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, vehicles and ambulances, small arms, clothing, textiles, and individual equipment. FY2009 Urban Solider Equipment items were intended to help Lebanese force conduct CT operations in an urban environment. This package included bulldozers, Humvee ambulances, tactical armor vests, rifles, and night vision device rifle scopes. FY2009 funds also supplied four Cessna Caravan aircraft, as well as related spare parts and training. FY2010 funds were used to provide weapons, ammunition, and vehicles to enable LAF SOF conduct missions in various tactical situations, particularly urban settings.

Bilateral assistance to the *Philippines, Indonesia, Bahrain, and Malaysia* has comprised 19%, or just under a fifth of total Section 1206 FY2006-FY2010 funding (Philippines, \$82.8 million; Indonesia, \$80.0 million; Bahrain, \$50.3 million; and Malaysia, \$43.8 million). Of these, only the Philippines and Indonesia received FY2010 assistance. FY2010 assistance for the Philippines provided a precision guided missile capability to assist Philippine armed forces' CT efforts in southern regions to combat the activities of the Jimaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyuf Group (\$18.4 million), and weapons and equipment to build the Philippines' Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance Battalion's CT capacity (\$9.3 million). For Indonesia, FY2010 funding provided support for maritime SOF counterterrorism activities (\$10.8 million), including 12 rigid hull

¹⁸ For more on security assistance to Lebanon, see CRS Report R40485, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*.

inflatable boats and related equipment and training, as well as equipment and training to improve day and night CT air missions (\$11.8 million).

Most of the FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 funding to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia focused on controlling the Celebes Sea (also known as the Sulawesi Sea), which provides a water border for all three countries, as well as the adjoining Molucca Sea and Sulu Sea. Assistance to these countries consisted of various coastal and maritime surveillance and detection systems and items, communications systems and equipment, aircraft equipment and training, and maritime interdiction packages. For Bahrain, Section 1206 focused on maritime assistance, providing coastal patrol crafts and related equipment and upgrading Bahrain's coastal surveillance system, as well as building the Bahrain Navy's special forces CT capability. Section 1206 assistance also helped to equip Bahrain's Defense Force special operations personnel for rapid deployment to rugged areas.

The remaining allocations, all under \$40 million each and comprising about 37% of the total, supported 27 bilateral programs, 14 multilateral programs, and the DIILS program. Most of these were CT programs focused on controlling adjacent maritime waters and on securing land and maritime borders. About 14% of all funding to date is divided between bilateral and multilateral programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, much of it for surveillance and control of maritime and land borders.

Funding to support partner nations' contributions to military and stability operations rose sharply in FY2010. Through FY2009, very little Section 1206 funding supported partner nations' contributions to stability operations. FY2007 funds provided stability operations training and equipment to Kazakhstan and to a group of four countries (Albania, Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine) to enable their current and future participation in NATO and/or U.S. led stability operations. Of the FY2010 funding, \$74 million has been provided to 12 European countries to assist their preparations for deployment to or participation in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Of this dozen, nine received funding on a bilateral basis. As notified to Congress, this funding was distributed as follows (by magnitude): Georgia (\$20.5 million), Romania (\$11.1 million), Hungary (\$10 million), Poland (\$9.9 million), Estonia, (\$9.1 million), Croatia (\$5.8 million), Latvia (\$2.5 million), Lithuania (\$2.3 million), and Bulgaria (\$1.6 million). Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania also received, with Albania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine, a total of \$2.8 million in funding to train military forces in those countries to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). FY2010 appropriations language specified that no more than \$75 million is to be spent on such activities.

Table 1, directly below, groups programs by magnitude of funding. For details, see **Table 2**, below.

Table 1. Countries/Group/Institution Grouped by Magnitude of Funds Received, Based on FY2006-FY2009 Allocations and FY2010 Congressional Notifications

(\$ U.S. millions, as of February 9, 2011)

Top Tier (Over \$40 million)	Upper Middle Tier (\$15 million- \$40 million)	Lower Middle Tier (\$10 million- \$15 million)	Bottom Tier (under \$10 million)
Yemen: 252.6	Georgia: 38.5	DR/Panama: 14.4	Poland: 9.9
Pakistan: 203.4	Kenya: 34.3	EARSI: 14.2	West & Central Africa Maritime Equip: 9.8
Lebanon: 128.5	Kazakhstan: 31.8	Mexico: 13.9	Caribbean Basin CT unit: 9.3
Philippines: 82.8	Djibouti: 26.8	Albania: 12.0	Estonia: 9.1
Indonesia: 80.0	Ethiopia: 25.5	Ukraine: 12.0	South East Africa Maritime Security: 8.4
Bahrain: 50.3	Caribbean Basin I: 23.4	Romania: 11.1	Nigeria and Sao Tome: 6.8
Malaysia: 43.8	Bangladesh: 22.7	Caribbean Basin II: 11.1	Mauritania: 6.4
	Kyrgyzstan: 21.2	West Africa Maritime Capability: 10.9	Chad and Nigeria: 6.2
	Tunisia: 18.6	Hungary: 10.0	Africa Maritime Awareness/ Territorial Water Threat Response: 5.8
	Sri Lanka: 18.2		Croatia: 5.8
			Mali: 5.1
			Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS): 3.9
			Maldives: 3.9
			TSCP Support:: 3.4
			Macedonia: 3.0
			Coalition Support to Counter IEDs: 2.8
			Latvia: 2.5
			Lithuania: 2.3
			Nigeria: 2.3
			Azerbaijan: 1.7
			Chad: 1.7
			Bulgaria: 1.6
			Africa Intelligence Aid: 1.1

Source: Based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and compiled from more detailed information provided in **Table 2**, below.

Notes: DR = Dominican Republic. Sao Tome = Sao Tome and Principe. EARSI = East Africa Regional Security Initiative. TSCP = TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership. IEDs = Improvised Explosive Devices.

Recipients in groups are as follows: 5 in Caribbean Basin I (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua); 4 in EARSI (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania); 4 in Caribbean Basin CT unit (Belize, Guyana,

Honduras, and Suriname); 5 in West and Central Africa Maritime Capability (Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Sierra Leone); 6 in Caribbean Basin II (Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama); 8 in West & Central Africa Maritime Equip (Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Togo); 15 in Africa Maritime Awareness/Response (Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe); 4 in TSCT Support (Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal); 7 in Coalition Support to Counter IEDs (Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine); and 8 in Africa Intelligence Aid (Algeria, Niger, Chad, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Mali).

Conditions on Section 1206 Programs

Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA requires that programs conducted under its authority observe and respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the "legitimate civilian authority within that country." The authority may not be used to provide any *type* of assistance that is otherwise prohibited by any provision of law. It also may not be used to provide assistance to any *country* that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law. The legislation also requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees before initiating each program. This notification must specify, among other things, the program country, budget, and completion date, as well as the source and planned expenditure of funds.

The State Department's 10th annual Trafficking in Persons Report, released June 14, 2010, identified Yemen as one of the six countries that recruits and uses children in governmental armed forces or government-supported armed groups.¹⁹ The report states that Yemen is therefore subject under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457, Title IV) to the cutoff of Section 1206 aid beginning in FY2011, absent a presidential national interest waiver, applicable exception, or a reinstatement of assistance.

Joint DOD-State Department Selection and Approval Process²⁰

Section 1206 programs are developed and selected under a "dual-key" process that culminates with the signature of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. As modified by the FY2007 John Warner NDAA, Section 1206 authority permits the Secretary of Defense to provide Section 1206 support with the "concurrence" of the Secretary of State. According to DOD and State Department officials, that term has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of State's approval. Section 1206 also requires both secretaries to jointly formulate any program and coordinate in its implementation. Coordination for the first year programs in FY2006 was reported to be spotty,²¹ but since then DOD and the State Department agencies have developed an extensive joint review process.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report: 10th Edition*, June 2010, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1429>.

²⁰ A joint report by the DOD and State Department Inspectors General dedicates Chapter 2 to the approval process and recommends several changes intended to strengthen and formalize the process. Inspectors General U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, *Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program*, Department of Defense and Department of State, Department of Defense Report No. IE-2009-007 and Department of State Report No. ISP-I-09-69, August 31, 2009, pp. 9-15, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/129491.pdf>. Hereafter referred to as *Inspectors General Report*.

²¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation*, GAO-07-416R, February 28, 2007. See p. 3.

Early in the fiscal year, the DOD Joint Staff and the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) kick off the process with a call for proposals issued with identical guidance. Most recommendations originate at the field level, where geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and U.S. embassy country teams jointly formulate proposals, although the degree of collaboration may vary. For proposals originated by the military, the COCOM forwards the proposal to Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For proposals originated in State Department channels, the Embassy forwards it to the State Department. The relevant Ambassador and Combatant Commander each must personally sign off on a proposal.

At the Pentagon and the State Department, staff conduct an extensive review process to prioritize the many proposals (they have numbered in the hundreds in recent years). The OSD Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities and Counterterrorism²² takes the DOD lead. It coordinates reviews for feasibility, political-military considerations, and legal status with OSD and Joint Staff regional and functional offices. At the State Department, the Bureau for Political-Military affairs consults with the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), the regional bureaus, and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F), and then forwards proposals to the State Department legal and congressional liaison offices for vetting. The offices of the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and of State may also indicate their priorities. Selection criteria include the urgency of the threat, the ability of the host nation to address that threat from its own resources, the ability of the host nation to sustain the capability, either from its own resources or through FMF funding, and the risks of inaction.²³

Once prioritized within each agency, the DOD and State lead offices convene a joint DOD-State review board to select those proposals that will be recommended to the Secretaries. Either Secretary can veto a project.

Once program memoranda are signed by both secretaries, DOD sends congressional notifications to the armed services, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees. No funds can be obligated until 15 days after these committees are notified and given the opportunity to review the projects.

A DOD document described this joint review process in 2008 as the "gold standard" for interagency planning and cooperation.²⁴ Nonetheless, some participants have described their experiences with the process as competitive and time-consuming, absorbing staff hours that are needed for other priorities. Some have expressed frustration that considerable time can be spent developing projects that are not approved. (Hundreds more proposals have been developed than approved, according to some participants.) Some participants state that the process has improved as those involved in developing projects get a better understanding of the intended purposes of Section 1206 and do not offer inappropriate projects. A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommends that the Combatant Commands, after consultation with the State Department, should appraise Embassy staff whether a project is likely to be approved before Embassy staff invest too much time in developing it.²⁵

²² This office is located under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and International Cooperation (SO/LIC&IC).

²³ Author's interviews with Department of State officials, September 2009, and e-mail exchanges with DOD and State Department officials, October and November 2009.

²⁴ *FY2009 DOD Summary Justification*, p. 103.

²⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Following the Money in Yemen and Lebanon: Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance and International Financial Institution Lending*, committee print, 111th (continued...)

Funding Provisions and Obligations

Section 1206 programs are funded from the DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) account. During the first two years of the program, DOD transferred funds from lower-priority missions to fund activities under Section 1206, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy (OSD/P). Since then, Congress has appropriated funds under the defense-wide O&M account. The current authorized limit for Section 1206 spending is \$350 million.

Section 1206 allocations totaled a bit under \$1 billion for FY2006 through FY2009, according to data provided by DOD in October 2009. Section 1206 allocations totaled some \$100 million for FY2006, \$274 million for FY2007, \$272 million for FY2008, and \$340 million for FY2009. (See **Table 2** below.) The amounts allocated are somewhat less than the amounts notified to Congress, which totaled over \$1 billion for FY2006-FY2009.

For FY2010, the DOD Appropriations Act as signed into law on December 19, 2009, (P.L. 111-118), contains about \$345 million for Section 1206 Global Train and Equip programs. In authorizing legislation,²⁶ Congress put in place a temporary \$75 million limit for FY2010 and FY2011 on Section 1206 funds used to train military troops of coalition partners to participate in or support military and stability operations (NDAA for FY2011, P.L. 111-84, signed into law October 28, 2009). DOD notified to Congress and the notified committees accepted \$330.9 million in FY2010 programs.

FY2011 Administration Request and Congressional Action

The Obama Administration's DOD appropriations request for FY2011 was about \$490 million, according to a DOD budget document estimate, presented in February 2010.²⁷ Because the current authorized limit is \$350 million, an appropriation of that amount would have required an increase in the authorized amount. H.R. 5136, the initial House version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), passed on May 28, 2010, included a provision to raise the authorized funding limit to \$500 million and extend the authority, currently set to expire in FY2011, through FY2012. It would also raise the limit on funding to build the capacity of foreign forces to participate in or support military and stability operations from \$75 million to \$100 million for FY2012.

S. 3454, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) version of the FY2011 NDAA, as reported June 4, 2010, has no corresponding provisions regarding an increase in the Section 1206 authorized funding limit or an extension of its expiration date. However, Section 1212 would

(...continued)

Cong., 1st sess., January 5, 2010, S. Prt. 111-38 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 13 and 24. Hereafter cited as *Following the Money*.

²⁶According to a 2010 DOD document, the amount appropriated for Section 1206 FY2010 obligations was \$344.18 million. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)*, February 2010, p. 435.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

provide authority to increase the limit from \$75 million to \$100 million for building the capacity of foreign military forces to participate in or support military and stability operations for FY2011 (as distinct from the House, which would increase the limit for FY2011).

In final action on the FY2011 DOD authorization, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Congress extended Section 1206 authority by one year; that is, through FY2012 at the \$350 million authorization level (Section 1207 of H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383, which became public law on January 7, 2011). It also raised to \$100 million the limit on the amount that could be provided to build the capacity of foreign military forces to participate in or support stabilization operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant.

(For information on provisions regarding assistance to the Yemen Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Forces, which the initial House bill would have provided under Section 1206 authority, see "Should Congress Broaden Section 1206 Authority to Include T&E for Security Forces?" below.)

FY2012 Administration Request and Congressional Action

In its FY2012 budget request, presented February 14, the Obama Administration once again asks for \$500 million in Section 1206 funding. (Under both the Bush and Obama administrations, DOD has repeatedly for more than the authorized level.) For Congress to appropriate this amount, the authorization ceiling of \$350 million would have to be raised.

In addition to its Section 1206 request, the Obama Administration asks for a \$50 million appropriation in each the DOD and the State Department budgets, and a new \$450 million DOD transfer authority, to fund a new three-year pilot project: a joint DOD-State Global Security Contingency Fund. The stated purposes of this fund seem to overlap with Section 1206 purposes. (For details on this fund, see below.)

Issues for Congress

Congress established Section 1206 as a flexible funding mechanism in order to provide the U.S. government with a means to respond rapidly to emerging (and some would say urgent) threats to U.S. security, and in particular the security of U.S. military forces that would pose too great a risk if left unattended. First established as a "pilot program," Section 1206 authority is subject to continuous congressional scrutiny. Issues range from the broad question of whether DOD should retain its own T&E authority, and whether it should be expanded or limited, to questions concerning Section 1206's utility and whether it should be reconsidered in the context of broader security assistance reform. For FY2012, a new question is whether Congress should fund both Section 1206 and the new Global Security Contingency Fund, given apparent overlapping purposes.

Should DOD Retain Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority?

Because Congress has bestowed responsibility on the Secretary of State for the oversight of all foreign assistance, including military education and training programs, and for ensuring foreign policy coherence,²⁸ many analysts argue that Section 1206 authority should be transferred to the Department of State, perhaps as a subset of FMF authority. On the other hand, those who believe DOD should retain Section 1206 authority, and even that Congress should make it a permanent DOD authority under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code, argue that Section 1206 serves very different purposes than FMF or Title 22 (Foreign Assistance) military education and training.

Those who believe DOD should retain Section 1206 authority emphasize its perceived importance as a military tool, as explained above, and differentiate the general purposes of Section 1206 and FMF. Over the past four years, defense and military officials, including geographic combatant commanders, have come to regard Section 1206 funding as vital to the U.S. defense efforts.²⁹ The January 2009 letter from the Under Secretary of Defense to Members of Congress (cited above) states that Section 1206 funds meet the military needs determined by the geographic Combatant Commanders "for tools to build capable, reliable, and interoperable partners as they prepare for—and seek to minimize the necessity for—military missions in the AORs [Areas of Responsibility]." Section 1206, according to the letter, is a flexible, *strategic* tool "to meet urgent and emergent threats and opportunities to build partner capacity... [and] ... to address critical counterterrorism needs as defined by the U.S. Government."

In contrast, the DOD letter presents FMF as a *political* tool "critical ... for executing our foreign policy" and "key to improving bilateral relationships, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity where host-nation and U.S. interests align." While Section 1206 responds to needs identified by the U.S. government, FMF is often used to meet the security needs of foreign countries as perceived by their governments. "Because many countries rely on FMF as a major resource for their military procurement budgets," FMF allocations are "affected by host-nation preferences and political engagement," the letter states.

One indicator of differing uses of Section 1206 and FMF assistance, at least in some regions, may be the relative size of funds spent in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region whose insecure borders and ungoverned spaces present, many argue, an ideal habitat for terrorist groups and thus a threat to U.S. military forces and U.S. national security. Estimated FY2009 FMF obligations in Africa were less than 2% of total obligations (\$8.3 million compared to \$4.6 billion overall). Section 1206 allocations for Africa were relatively greater, representing some 14% of total FY2009 allocations (\$48.7 million of \$339.9 million).

²⁸ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), Section 622(c)(22 U.S.C. 2382), states that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, "shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby." The Armed Export Control Act, which as of 1968 authorizes the FMS/FMF program, similarly mandates that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, be responsible for "the continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this chapter..." (P.L. 90-629, as amended, Chapter 1, Section 2(b), 22 U.S.C. 2752).

²⁹ According to a DOD document, the "geographic Combatant Commanders consider global train and equip authority the Department's single most important tool for building partner operational capacity, shaping the environment, and countering terrorism outside Iraq and Afghanistan." *FY2009 Budget Request Summary Justification*, p. 102.

In the letter, DOD denied that Section 1206 programs are “as some have claimed, programs historically conducted by the State Department....” The United States “has not conducted programs like this before.”

On the other hand, critics of Section 1206 deny any significant distinction between Section 1206 and State Department train and equip authorities, and some frequently cite it as one of a number of programs that signal the “militarization” of U.S. foreign assistance,³⁰ which is perceived as detrimental to U.S. relations with foreign governments and damaging to the U.S. image with foreign populations. Advocates of placing Section 1206 under the State Department’s authority and budget see an inevitable difference of perspective between a military commander and those vested with authority for foreign policy. A military commander, they argue, rightfully focuses on the objectives of the current mission, without necessarily taking into account the long-term implications for foreign relations. Providing DOD with authority and funding for Section 1206 and other foreign assistance-type activities outside of active combat zones gives DOD undue influence over shaping and conducting foreign relations and U.S. diplomacy, which are the responsibility of the Ambassador and the State Department, proponents argue. Some also state that DOD Section 1206 authority “weakens congressional oversight, including human rights protections.”³¹

Several foreign policy research institutions have advocated placing Section 1206 programs under State Department authority and the oversight of the Secretary of State.

- The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center argue that “the Secretary of State has and should have responsibility for assuring that all foreign and security assistance is carried out in accord with U.S. foreign policy, including setting overall policy, approving countries to receive assistance, and setting the budget for such assistance.”³² The authors of this report, drawing on a panel comprised of former Ambassadors and other State Department personnel, stated that to do otherwise would undermine the Secretary of State’s responsibility for the “fundamental direction of U.S. foreign policy.”³³
- The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, while recognizing Section 1206’s importance to DOD, nevertheless voiced concern that Section 1206 “has the potential to impinge on State Department leadership in U.S. foreign policy and the authorities given the secretary of state under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).”³⁴

³⁰ I.e., Congress’s grant to DOD of several new or expanded DOD authorities and funding accounts such as the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP),

³¹ Adam Isacson, *The Pentagon’s military aid role grows*, on the Just the Facts website <http://justf.org/blog>, January 26, 2010.

³² *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, p. 23.

³³ *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, p. 12.

³⁴ Representative Robert Andrews and Representative Mark Kirk, co-chairs, *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance: Final Report of the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2008, p. 7. (On the same page, the report further notes: “A number of legislators on Capitol Hill have expressed fear that Section 1206 could undermine the coherence of U.S. foreign policy, by allowing combatant commanders to assist foreign security forces without taking account of broader U.S. considerations at stake (continued...)”)

- A Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) report expresses concrete concerns regarding coherence, transparency, and fiscal discipline. Authors Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams argue that authority for Section 1206 (as well as for other security assistance programs) should be vested in the State Department “in order to ensure that security assistance does not drive or conflict with overall U.S. international engagement.”³⁵ They view Section 1206 and other recent security assistance authorities as generally parallel to or duplicating State Department’s traditional security assistance programs.³⁶ “The risks in this parallel system of authorities and programs are that security assistance becomes more complex and confusing, that it is disconnected from overall, long-term U.S. diplomacy and national security strategy, and that money is wasted through overlapping, uncoordinated, or conflicting efforts,” they wrote.³⁷

Despite this widespread perception, some may argue that there may be ways in which DOD-controlled Section 1206 assistance can benefit U.S. interests. For instance, recipients may perceive DOD assistance as representing a serious, enduring U.S. security interest in that country, facilitating military-to-military contacts.

Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Appropriately?

Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that Section 1206 funds are being used in some countries for programs that would be funded more appropriately under FMF. An August 2009 report by the DOD and State Department Inspectors General that reviewed programs in eight countries carried out with FY2006 funds stated that “the Defense and State Departments have conducted the Section 1206 program in compliance with the law.”³⁸ Member concerns seem to center on other countries and a longer timeframe, however.

Member concerns were reflected in a Members’ letter to Secretary Gates in October 2008. In that letter, the chairmen and ranking Members of the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees expressed concern that the DOD and the State Department were requesting funds for projects that did not fit within Section 1206’s stated purposes.³⁹ They also expressed concern that some Section 1206 programs seemed to address general foreign policy and security concerns,

(...continued)

in bilateral and regional relationships.”) Hereafter referred to as *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance*.

³⁵ Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, *Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation*, MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2008, p. 21. Hereafter referred to as *Strengthening Statecraft and Security*.

³⁶ Other DOD security assistance authorities specifically discussed in this report are Coalition Support Funds, CERP, and CTFP.

³⁷ *Strengthening Statecraft and Security*, p. 70.

³⁸ The countries are reviewed were Dominican Republic, Georgia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sri Lanka. *Inspectors General Report*, p. ii (quotation)..

³⁹ Addressed to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the letter was dated October 8, 2008, and signed by Representatives Howard L. Berman, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HFAC), Ike Skelton, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, HFAC ranking member, and Duncan Hunter, HASC ranking member.

rather than an identifiable link to a transnational terrorist movement or threat to the United States as required for Section 1206 funding.

In some cases, these Members stated that Section 1206 proposals appeared identical to FMF programs or substitutes for FMF where a country did not want to use FMF funds. The letter pointed specifically to Pakistan in this regard, stating that the helicopter maintenance provided by Section 1206 could not be considered an emerging need because the Pakistani government had requested such assistance in 2005. The letter also pointed to the provision of certain equipment to Kazakhstan as failing to meet "an identifiable terrorist threat," and noted that Indonesia had communicated that it would not use radar systems provided through Section 1206 primarily for CT purposes.

To clarify accepted purposes for Section 1206 funding and prioritize the requests that DOD presented to Congress, the Members requested that DOD provide "greater clarification as to the threshold test for the 'emerging threats' concept.... Absent sufficient metrics to evaluate an emerging threat, the 1206 program remains just as susceptible as FMF to be used as a political tool with foreign countries, not as a strategic tool to address critical U.S. counterterrorism needs." The Members stated that they believed Section 1206 "should be provided in cases where there is more than just a *potential* terrorist threat...."

As noted earlier, the outgoing Bush Administration responded to the Members with a three and one-half page defense of the program in a letter from the Under Secretary of Defense. In that letter, DOD not only differentiated between Section 1206's military and strategic purposes and FMF's political purposes (as discussed in the section above), but also stated that Section 1206 funds "can play a useful role in addressing security concerns before they develop into acute threats, and thereby mitigate the need for future U.S. military intervention."⁴⁰

The letter did not specify criteria for a "threshold test" that would define and identify an emerging threat. It did, however, explain in general terms the basis on which Section 1206 programs are chosen. In addition to Section 1206 emphasis on *strategic* purposes (as discussed above), the letter states that the authority is used "proactively" to take the early steps necessary to counteract negative trends to forestall crises.

The letter also discusses the parameters within which Section 1206 funds are used. "There has been no attempt to ensure that all regions are provided assistance under this authority—or that all elements of a foreign military are provided with equipment," according to the letter. "To the contrary, Section 1206 programs are targeted at countries—and particularly military units within countries—where focused training and equipment will have the most significant impact in achieving the objectives of the Section 1206 authority." Programs are chosen "not only based on current threats, but also on the gap between these threats and partners' capacity to prevent or deter them, and the likelihood that this gap will grow without U.S. military support."

Addressing the Members' concerns about Section 1206 aid to Pakistan, the letter describes Section 1206 support for Pakistan's helicopter fleets as meeting U.S. military needs by supporting "security operations in Pakistan's border region that are critical to the *United States* [emphasis in the original] for success in Afghanistan." There is a separate five-year FMF with Pakistan that

⁴⁰ *OSD letter of January 16, 2009, responding to Members of Congress. op. cit.* Moreover, the letter notes that Secretary of State Gates "has argued consistently for increased funding for Title 22 programs—including FMF—because our diplomats need additional resources to advance U.S. interests."

serves a different purpose: it was designed "to build our bilateral relationship and assist Pakistan as it procures the capabilities *it* sees as important for its own defense," according to the letter.

Some analysts have questioned whether the purposes for which FMF and Section 1206 can be used are as different as described by DOD. Some also wonder whether items provided under Section 1206 assistance could not just as well be provided through FMF, a State Department fund, if that pot of money were increased.

Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Effectively?

With the Section 1206 program in its sixth year, some policymakers and analysts have questioned whether the program is effective. Some have been troubled by the lack of criteria for determining the effects of Section 1206 programs.

A July 2008 assessment of Section 1206 assistance to four countries was generally positive, citing improvements in operational capacity, greater information-sharing and cooperation, and troop morale, but also noting one country's lack of capacity to investigate warnings produced by sensors and another's inability to identify known or suspected terrorists.⁴¹ Likewise, an August 2009 joint report by the DOD and State Department inspectors general found the projects that it examined in eight countries (all conducted with FY2006 funds, as noted above) to be "effective in building partner nation capacity for counterterrorist and military or stability operations and helped those nations increase control over their borders and ungoverned spaces and counter terrorism."⁴² Nevertheless, this same report recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, together with Joint Staff and Combatant Commands "should develop metrics of effectiveness for building Section 1206 partnership capacity and establish clearly defined *outputs* and *outcomes*."⁴³

In an April 2010 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that Section 1206 authority offers a unique and more timely mechanism than the State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for responding to U.S. military priorities that require training and equipping foreign military forces. The GAO expressed concerns, however, about the extent of monitoring and evaluation of these programs and about their sustainability.

According to that GAO report, DOD and State "have conducted little monitoring and evaluation" of Section 1206 programs, with reporting consisting generally of anecdotal information, and "have not consistently defined performance measures for their Section 1206 projects."⁴⁴ The GAO stated that DOD has taken initial steps to establish a monitoring and evaluation system, and that DOD and the State Department have made improvements in defining performance measures.

GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, "develop and implement specific plans to monitor, evaluate, and report routinely on Section 1206

⁴¹ *CNA Corporation Assessments*. The countries are Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, and Sao Tome and Principe. The study was conducted in response to a request from the OSD Global Security Affairs Office. The report noted that in some cases it relied on secondary source reporting. See the Executive Summary, pp. 1-4.

⁴² *Inspectors General Report*, p.iii.

⁴³ *Inspectors General Report*, p. iv, Recommendation 9.

⁴⁴ United States Government Accountability Office, *DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs*, GAO-10-431, Washington, D.C., April 15, 2010, pp. 5, 32. Accessible through <http://www.gao.gov>. Hereafter referred to as GAO-10-431.

project outcomes and their impact on U.S. strategic objectives,” and “base further decisions about sustaining existing Section 1206 projects of the results” of those efforts.⁴⁵ GAO also made two specific recommendations concerning sustainability, covered in the section on that topic below. DOD concurred with these recommendations.

Some proponents note that establishing the outcomes of programs that are essentially preventive in nature is impossible, not unlike trying to prove a negative. Some, however, suggest that a possible indicator of utility would be an estimate of the cost to the U.S. military of compensating for the lack of the capability provided under Section 1206 or of carrying out that function itself.

Sustainability

For Section 1206 CT programs to be effective, most believe that they must be sustained over the long run. Some policymakers are concerned that recipient countries will not continue to fund Section 1206 programs when Section 1206 funding ends. (Because Section 1206 authority established to meet immediate needs, Section 1206 must cease when a threat is no longer “emerging,” however that may be defined.) The HFAC-HASC letter of October 2008 stated that DOD and the State Department had not provided sufficient information on how recipient countries would sustain Section 1206-provided equipment. “We understand the Departments’ plan to use FMF (or encourage a recipient country to use national funds) for this purpose, but this approach simply defers resource shortcomings by a few years.” According to DOD’s January 2009 letter, DOD and the State Department have determined that “Section 1206 authority could be used to begin critical programs, after which we would work with host nations to identify national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in FMF requests.” The ability of recipient governments to sustain programs is taken into account in program planning, and at times programs have been cut back to ensure a recipient government could sustain the program, according to the letter. In addition, Section 1206 programs all provide “two-year spare parts packages and training to operate and sustain equipment, including train-the-trainer support.” This is intended to minimize future costs.

Some analysts question whether the U.S. government can be adequately assured that a program will be sustained unless, in the planning stages, the host nation government expressly agrees to the program and promises to sustain it. The 2009 joint State Department and DOD Inspectors General report recommends that, during the planning process, host nation governments commit to a program and demonstrate the capability to sustain it.⁴⁶

The GAO flagged sustainment as a major issue in its April 2010 report: “The long-term impact of Section 1206 projects is at risk because U.S. agencies have not fully addressed how to sustain these projects,” according to the GAO.⁴⁷ Pointing out that 76% of Section 1206 projects are in

⁴⁵ GAO-10-431, p. 38.

⁴⁶ *Inspectors General Report*, p. iii (Recommendation 1) and p. iv (Recommendation 8). Recommendation 1 suggests that DOD and the State Department revise the Section 1206 proposal submission template to require a statement describing the actual or potential terrorist threat in detail, as well as the “bilateral consultation and coordination process for formulating the proposal” and the “partner nation’s commitment and capability to sustain project implementation.” Recommendation 8 states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “in coordination with the Director of the Joint Staff and Department of State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, should direct Security Cooperation Officers to work with partner nations to develop a full Concept of Operations by the final approval of the project.”

⁴⁷ GAO-10-431, p. 4.

low- to lower-middle income countries, the GAO judged these projects to be “potentially threatened: by the unwillingness or limited means” of recipient countries to sustain them. “Only 35 (26 percent) of the 135 approved project proposals we reviewed explicitly address the recipient countries’ ability to sustain the projects, and 9 (7 percent) of those 135 proposals provided specific estimates of the costs involved,”⁴⁸ GAO reported. Although others point to FMF as a source of funds for sustainment, GAO cautioned that “U.S. law potentially limits the availability of FMF funds for sustainment, and fiscal year 2009 DOD and State guidelines for the 1206 program preclude funding projects that require follow-on U.S. resources to sustain them.”⁴⁹ In addition to recommending that the U.S. government base decisions on sustaining projects on the results determined through monitoring and evaluation, GAO recommended that DOD and State estimate sustainment costs for the projects when they are proposed, and “where possible, obtain a commitment from partner nations to fund those costs.”⁵⁰ It also recommended that the Secretary of Defense “seek further guidance from Congress” on what funding authorities are appropriate to sustain Section 1206 projects.⁵¹ DOD concurred with all GAO recommendations.

Timeliness

A major rationale for establishing Section 1206 authority was to provide an antidote to the long lead time required by FMF to supply equipment. As mentioned in a section above, some Section 1206 deliveries are taking longer than originally anticipated. The August 2009 joint report of the DOD and State Department Inspectors General indicates a 6- to 18-month timeline for delivery of Section 1206 equipment and supplies provided through FY2006 funds and stated that DSCA agency actions are needed to reduce procurement and shipping delays to respond more quickly to actual or emerging terrorist threats, and to ensure all approved case funds are obligated before funding authorization expires.⁵² The April 2010 GAO report cast Section 1206 response timeframes in a more favorable light, stating that Section 1206 funds enable DOD and State “to respond to urgent and emergent needs more quickly than they have been able to do with FMF and other security assistance programs.” GAO found that these agencies “have often formulated and begun implementing projects within 1 fiscal year, while FMF projects have usually required up to 3 years of planning.”⁵³

State Department officials attribute lags, where they occur, to multiple causes, most importantly the shortage of readily available equipment due to the small number of U.S. producers. They also cite processing delays at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), attributed to an insufficient number of staff to handle the agency’s workload and time-consuming procedures, as a factor. Some analysts point out that these same factors affect deliveries of FMF-provided equipment.

The DOD and State Department Inspectors General report, cited above, indicates that consistent information on Section 1206 expenditures and deliveries is not available to U.S. Embassy country team members. As a result, the report recommends that DOD develop a periodic report to track

⁴⁸ GAO-10-431, p. 4.

⁴⁹ GAO-10-431, p. 4.

⁵⁰ GAO-10-431, p. 39.

⁵¹ GAO-10-431, p. 39.

⁵² *Inspectors General Report*, pp. ii and iv (Recommendation 3).

⁵³ GAO-10-431, p. 4.

actual obligations and expenditures of funds and other data.⁵⁴ Similarly, a January 2010 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommends that the Administration “develop a centralized information management system, with appropriate checks and balances for accuracy, to accurately track the status of all Section 1206 assistance.”⁵⁵

Should Congress Provide the State Department and DOD with Overlapping Section 1206-type Authorities?

As discussed in the **Appendix** below, Section 841 of the House version of the foreign relations authorization bill for FY2010 and FY2011 (H.R. 2410, H.Rept. 111-136) would create a new “Security Assistance Contingency Fund” for the State Department with purposes that would overlap with Section 1206 (i.e., for counterterrorism programs and for training foreign military and other security forces for participating in operations with U.S. forces). The bill would provide \$50 million in each FY2010 and FY2011, half by authorizing new appropriations and half by authorizing the use of FMF funds for these purposes.

There is no indication in the bill’s report language that it is intended to replace Section 1206. As drafted, it seems designed as a complementary measure. The accompanying House Foreign Affairs Committee report states merely that the “authority is necessary for the Department of State to start stepping up to the responsibility to provide assistance to train and equip foreign military forces to support U.S. security operations and to better engage in counter-terror operations”(H.Rept. 111-136).

Some policymakers may regard such a contingency fund as a means to provide the State Department with funds for activities that it may regard as a higher priority than does DOD or the armed services committees. For instance, the State Department is interested in providing resources to train troops to participate in U.S. stability operations as a means to cultivate foreign relations.⁵⁶ This has not been a priority for DOD, and the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the FY2010 NDAA would cap funding for such purposes at \$75 million. In addition, some policymakers may view Section 841 as a means to provide the State Department with resources to provide follow-up to counterterrorism activities begun under Section 1206, rather than using FMF funds for that purpose.

However, some might question whether Section 841 would provide sufficient advantage over the existing FMF funding mechanism to justify creating a new authority. As Section 841 would not require consultation with DOD on the use of the funds, this authority may somewhat expedite decisionmaking within the State Department on counterterrorism funding. The amount of time that could be saved over the current three-year timeline for FMF funding decisions might well depend on the procedures developed by the State Department to process such funding, including coordination with DOD, and on possible reforms to the DSCA. Another factor would be whether Congress was willing to consider such funds in an expedited manner through congressional committees, as it does for Section 1206 funding, rather than as part of the annual budget request as it does with FMF funding.

⁵⁴ *Inspectors General Report*, p. iv (Recommendation 4), and pp. 21-23.

⁵⁵ *Follow the Money*, p. 21.

⁵⁶ Author’s interview with State Department officials, September 2009.

For some policymakers and analysts, Section 841 might fall far short of the ample reform that some advocate to address what they perceive as a serious imbalance between DOD and State Department resources and authorities, including in the security assistance area.⁵⁷ Some Members may not wish to create yet another flexible funding mechanism that puts funds beyond the oversight of Congress as a whole, although as Section 1206 specified congressional committees would exercise oversight before the State Department could obligate funds.⁵⁸ (Section 841 would require that the State Department notify the two foreign affairs committees and the two foreign operations appropriations subcommittees 15 days before obligation funds.)

Should Congress Broaden Section 1206 Authority to Include T&E for Security Forces?

For several years, DOD has argued for authority to train and equip a variety of counterterrorism security forces outside the military structure. DOD's original proposal included "armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police forces," but the initial Section 1206 legislation restricted the use of funds to military forces. Subsequent requests by DOD (in 2007 and 2008) proposed expanding Section 1206 authority to include other security forces. DOD's FY2009 NDAA proposal requested that a wide range of police and security forces be included, specifically gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. In 2008, Congress amended Section 1206 authority to include only non-military maritime security forces, such as coast guards,⁵⁹ a category not named in the DOD request.

Because foreign counterterrorism units sometimes are configured as civilian forces under foreign Ministries of the Interior rather than as military forces, some analysts argue that the lack of authority to train and equip foreign security forces impedes the United States' ability to build foreign capacity for counterterrorism. In January 2008, the final report of the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended the expansion of 1206 authority to include non-military security forces because of "the operational necessity of working with foreign security forces to advance key counterterrorism objects...."⁶⁰

However, some analysts argue that Congress should reserve funding for civilian security force training to the State Department. Some argue that there are fundamental differences in training

⁵⁷ *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance*. This report suggests an alternative to Section 1206 would "simply be to build a larger State Department budget with increased and more flexible counterterrorism funding. In principle, there is no reason that the administration could not propose—and Congress fund—a contingency fund within the FMF account to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies by training security forces in counterterrorism and stability operations." (p. 11) It specifically recommends "the gradual phasing out of Section 1206 authority with the creation of a substantial, flexible contingency fund (notionally within FMF) to support current 1206 programs." (p. 39)

⁵⁸ Congress in general has resisted providing the executive branch with "blank checks" by creating contingency accounts. One often cited example is the standing Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) emergency relief account, funded through foreign operations appropriations. This account is drawn on in urgent situations and is replenished automatically as needed. In establishing Section 1206 years later, Congress built in a higher level of congressional review by requiring notification to specified committees.

⁵⁹ Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417, Section 1206.

⁶⁰ *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance*, p. 10.

civilian and military personnel and U.S. military forces are suited solely for training the latter. Some stress that the use of U.S. military forces to train civilian police and other security forces conveys an undesirable blurring of police and military roles and functions. In some countries, where there may be tensions between military and police forces, such a blurring may cause resentments and complicate bilateral relations. In addition, DOD training of police personnel can put a military face on U.S. assistance in a sensitive area, undermining the concept that civilians should be in the lead on internal security affairs. In some countries, where there may be tensions between military and police forces, such a blurring may complicate bilateral relations.

This concern was reflected in House action on its initial version of FY2011 NDAA, H.R. 5136. Under Section 1203 of this bill, the House would have provided Section 1206 funding to train and equip Yemen's Ministry of Interior (MOI) CT forces, with the stipulation that the funds be transferred to the Department of State, which would assume responsibility for the program.⁶¹ The SASC version of the bill, S. 3454, would have provided a new, separate, and discrete authority for DOD to train and equip the Yemini MOI CT forces. The House version of the revised FY2011 NDAA, H.R. 6523, would also have provided a discrete authority. In the end, the conference version of the final FY2011 Ike Skelton NDAA (H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383) provided a separate authority in Section 1205 for the Secretary of Defense to provide, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, up to \$75 million of funds available for operations and maintenance in FY2011 for the Yemen MOI CT forces to conduct CT operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates.

Should Congress Approve a Joint DOD-State Global Contingency Security Fund?

The DOD and State Department FY2012 budget requests propose the establishment of a new, joint (or "pooled") State-DOD Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) "to address rapidly changing, transnational, asymmetric threats, and emergent opportunities," according to the State Department budget request. Each department requests a \$50 million appropriation for the fund. In addition, DOD requests a \$450 million transfer authority to move funds from unspecified DOD accounts to the GSCF. DOD budget documents issued thus far do not detail plans for the fund. However, DOD is expected to submit an authorization proposal in its FY2012 NDAA request. The State Department's request describes the fund as a means "to streamline the way the U.S. Government provides assistance for military forces and other security forces responsible for conducting border and maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations, as well as the government agencies responsible for such forces." It can also be used to provide assistance to foreign justice sector and other rule of law programs, and to stabilization efforts.

According to the State Department request and to information provided by DOD officials, the GSCF would be a three-year pilot project, subject to a joint Secretary of State-Secretary of Defense "dual-key" approval process, with programs would be "collaboratively developed" by

⁶¹ The House action followed the lead of the Obama Administration's February 1, 2010, FY2011 budget request, which transferred three controversial DOD assistance programs to the Department of State budget: Iraq Police Training, crisis reaction funding for reconstruction, security and stabilization activities (formerly funded under DOD "Section 1207," (P.L. 109-163 as amended) authority, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). (DOD retains an account with a similar name and acronym, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund or PCF.) In its budget request, the Department of State stated that the transfer of these programs would "begin to rebalance the roles between DOD and State."

State and DOD. These programs would be implemented primarily by these agencies, but also by USAID and others as appropriate.

For some policymakers and analysts, the GSCF proposal is a positive, long-awaited first step toward the development of integrated, interagency funding streams for agencies that carry out related programs. Some have long advocated pooled foreign assistance accounts, in particular pooled security or counterterrorism accounts (see the section below), viewing them as potentially providing the impetus for greater interagency coordination on program planning and implementation and leading to more effective U.S. efforts abroad.

For others, the GSCF proposal raises many questions. Some are budgetary. Because the fund could be used to respond to emerging counterterrorism threats, its purposes appear to some analysts to overlap with the purposes of Section 1206. Some question whether the DOD should be provided with two large funding streams for similar purposes. Others, however, judge that the current Section 1206 funding level does not enable DOD to meet all needs. In addition, some would point out that GSCF appears intended for a wide variety of other purposes, including the stabilization purposes of the now expired Section 1207 "stabilization and security" authority.⁶²

Other questions reflect continuing concerns about DOD's role in training and equipping foreign military and security forces. If drafted along the lines suggested in the budget requests, a GSCF authority could provide DOD with authority to train and otherwise assist foreign security forces, a concept that Congress has repeatedly rejected in conjunction with Section 1206 requests. In part depending on the specific arrangements proposed for the exercise of "dual key" authority, some may also wonder whether the Secretary of State could exercise effective control over the use of GSCF funds. Other issues may emerge when details of the proposal are made public.

Should Congress Consider Broader Security Assistance Reform?

Discussion about Section 1206 often takes place in the context of a perceived need for broad security assistance reform. Section 1206 represents a significant part of the security assistance package, but many analysts are concerned with the problems involving the whole gamut of security assistance programs under both State Department and DOD authorities.⁶³ Indeed, some relate the establishment of Section 1206, as well as perceived problems with it, to problems experienced with traditional State Department authorities: "The current [State Department] mechanisms, some of which reflect statutory requirements, are antiquated and slow to respond to changing security threats, one of the explanations for DOD's expanded assistance portfolio in recent years," according to one report.⁶⁴ Some analysts question whether Section 1206 authority would be needed at all if the systems carrying out traditional security assistance authorities were provided sufficient funds and personnel, and were reorganized to operate more efficiently.

⁶² Section 1207, P.L. 109-163, as amended. For more information, see CRS Report RS22871, *Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns*.

⁶³ According to the report by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, one of "the most striking trends during the past two decades has been the growing role of the Defense Department in providing foreign assistance under its own statutory authorities....by the end of the 1990s ... DOD was directly managing 15 security assistance programs accounting for well over \$1 billion annually." *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, p. 22.

⁶⁴ *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, p. 23.

Several recent reports have reviewed current security assistance programs, authorities, and resources, and recommended substantial reform. The MIT report mentioned in a section above advocates the creation of "a new architecture that is agile, flexible and adequately funded to deal with the new security challenges" and that "can and should make ample use of DOD's capabilities...."⁶⁵ Specific recommendations call for changes that would improve strategic planning, policy coherence, interagency coordination, budgeting procedures, transparency, and discipline, and congressional oversight. Among their suggestions where Congress has a direct role are the following:⁶⁶

- Restructure security assistance authorities by grouping State Department and DOD authorities to create new programs.
- Expand contingency authority for all security assistance, and provide multiyear funding in order to provide the State Department and DOD with broader discretion to reallocate and target funds as requirements change.
- Consolidate security assistance budgets, with the executive branch agencies presenting a single, multiagency, security assistance budget. (Some would emphasize the need for a single counterterrorism budget.)⁶⁷
- Undertake reforms within the State Department to "right-size" the Bureau of Political Military (PM) Affairs, as well as the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, to enable the State Department to oversee budgeting for security assistance programs.⁶⁸
- Review the DSCA structure and processes to "to right-size its bureaucracy and reduce inflexibility."⁶⁹
- Consider joint congressional hearings on security assistance programs, involving both defense and foreign policy authorization and appropriations committees.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ *Strengthening Statecraft and Security*, p. 71. This recommendation would place the new architecture under State Department authority, however.

⁶⁶ This section draws principally on specific recommendations made in three reports: *Strengthening Statecraft and Security*, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, and *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance*, although other reports may have similar proposals. Related proposals are contained in *Beyond Assistance: The HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform*, December, 2007, and *Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield*, November 2008, as well as other publications.

⁶⁷ See *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance*, p. 38, which recommends that "DOD, State and USAID present relevant congressional committees with a joint CT security assistance budget as part of a broader effort to require executive branch transparency on how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together." (p. 38)

⁶⁸ *Strengthening Statecraft and Security*, p. 73. In *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center also express concern about State Department staffing levels for security assistance, in particular the number of foreign service personnel who specialize in political-military affairs. (p. 23)

⁶⁹ *Strengthening Statecraft and Security* suggests creating three new programs: (1) a more flexible train and equip program combining FMF, Section 1206, and the State Department's peacekeeping account (PKO); (2) a more coherent foreign military education program by combining IMET and the DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program; and (3) a revamped support program combining the coalition support and the economic support (CSF and ESF) funds. It also suggests redistributing responsibility for activities carried out under the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and other DOD "foreign assistance" programs, assigning responsibility for longer-term governance and development programs to the State Department and USAID, and reserving to DOD responsibility for shorter-term, urgent projects closely related to combat needs or to operations in insecure areas. (p.74)

⁷⁰ *Strengthening Statecraft and Security*, p. 75.

Recommendations for systemic reforms that are largely within the purview of the executive branch include:

- Provide White House oversight of security assistance by establishing a permanent interagency group under the National Security Council (NSC);⁷¹ and
- Provide for stronger State/DOD joint strategic planning and coordination at the regional level.

The State Department/USAID QDDR report of December 2010 proposes an integrated interagency budget for security and other assistance that, if implemented, may affect Section 1206 authority. This document states that State, USAID, and DOD are “currently exploring the creation of a 3-year joint pilot pooled fund ... for security and justice sector and stabilization assistance.”⁷² According to the QDDR, the establishment of “a pooled funding mechanism would provide needed flexibility and resources in situations in which the confluence of several security challenges, such as armed conflict, terrorist activities or organized crime, converge with state fragility. In such circumstances, a coordinated and holistic assistance response across the security and justice sector is necessary, requiring State and USAID to work in complete synchronization with the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and other agencies.”

⁷¹ *Strengthening Statecraft and Security* recommends that this group be co-chaired by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in order to ensure “the integration of security assistance policies and programs into the broader national security strategy,” to resolve “policy and program disagreements between the Departments of State and Defense,” and to provide “overarching policy guidance to improve consistency with overall national security strategy... .” (pp. 72-73).

⁷² QDDR, p. 203 for citations.

Table 2. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-FY2009 Allocations and FY2010 Congressional Notifications

(\$ U.S. millions)

Recipient(s)	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Totals
General Human Rights/Respect for Civilian Authority (HR/RCA) Training							
Recipients unspecified. Funding to Defense Institute of International Legal Studies to conduct training.	HR/ RCATraining	—	—	0.6	—	—	3.9
Recipients and trainer(s) unspecified.	Follow-on to FY2008 HR/RCA training for 35 countries	—	—	—	1.2	—	
Bangladesh, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Suriname, Indonesia are named recipients. Trainer(s) unspecified.	Follow-on to FY2008 HR/RCA training. (Notified Amount)	—	—	—	0.3	—	
All FY2010 Section 1206 assistance						1.8	
Total HR/RCA Training (when not included in country/regional allocations)		0	0	0.6	1.5	1.8	3.9
AFRICA							
Chad	Tactical Airlift Capacity Training	—	1.7	—	—	—	1.7
Djibouti	Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Response, Interdiction, and Coastal Security Enhancement	—	8.0	—	—	—	26.8
	Counterterrorist (CT) Communications Package	—	—	5.1	—	—	
	CT Capabilities Package	—	—	—	3.3	—	
	Regional Maritime Awareness Capability					10.4	
Ethiopia	CT Communications and Combat Engineering Capability	—	—	13.3	—	—	25.5
	Night Vision Capability Package	—	—	1.9	—	—	
	Regiment and Platoon CT Initiative	—	—	—	10.3	—	
Kenya	Border Security Initiative	—	—	4.1	—	—	34.3
	Border and Coastal Security Enhancement	—	—	6.6	—	—	
	Maritime Security Initiative	—	—	—	15.2	—	

Recipient(s)	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Totals
	Border CT Security	—	—	—	—	8.5	
Mali	Light infantry Equipment for CT (Redirected FY2007 Mauritania aid and additional storage and transportation costs charged in FY2009.)	—	4.5	—	0.6	—	5.1
Mauritania	Logistics CT Support	—	—	—	—	6.4	6.4
Nigeria	CT Capacity Building for Military Forces	—	—	—	1.5	—	2.3
	Light infantry Vehicles, Communications Equipment, and other equipment (Equipment redirected from Chad FY2007 program.)	—	—	—	0.8	—	
Tunisia	Suppressing Trans-Border Terrorist Activity	—	—	10.0	—	—	18.6
	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capability to secure borders.	—	—	—	8.6	—	
Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal	Civil-Military Operations Training in Support of the TransSahara CT Program	—	3.4	—	—	—	3.4
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania	East Africa Regional Security Initiative	—	14.2	—	—	—	14.2
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe	Gulf of Guinea Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Aid	6.8	—	—	—	—	6.8
Chad and Nigeria	Multinational Information-sharing Network Aid	6.2	—	—	—	—	6.2
Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger and Senegal	Partner Nation Intelligence Capability Aid	—	1.1	—	—	—	1.1
Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Sao Tome and Principe	MDA and Territorial Water Threat Response Capability Establishment	—	5.8	—	—	—	5.8
Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Togo	West and Central Africa Maritime Equipment Package	—	—	9.8	—	—	9.8
Cameroon, Gabon,	West Africa Maritime	—	—	10.9	—	—	10.9

Recipient(s)	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Totals
Senegal, Sierra Leone (Guinea deleted due to the Dec. 2008 coup d'etat.)	Security Capability Enhancement					—	
Mozambique, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles	South East African Maritime Security Initiative	—	—	—	8.4	—	8.4
Total Africa		13.0	38.7	61.7	48.7	25.3	187.4
GREATER EUROPE							
Albania	CT Capability Aid	—	6.7	—	—	—	12.0
	Maritime Coastal Patrol CT Capability Enhancement	—	—	5.3	—	—	
Bulgaria	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs)	—	—	—	—	1.6	1.6
Croatia	Build capacity of military forces to support the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF)	—	—	—	—	5.8	5.8
Estonia	Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF	—	—	—	—	9.1	9.1
Georgia	CT Capability Aid	—	6.5	—	—	—	38.5
	Special Forces T&E	—	—	11.5	—	—	
	Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF	—	—	—	—	20.5	
Hungary	Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF	—	—	—	—	10.0	10.0
Latvia	Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF	—	—	—	—	2.5	2.5
Lithuania	Build capacity of military forces to support ISAF	—	—	—	—	2.3	2.3
Macedonia	CT Capability Aid	—	3.0	—	—	—	3.0
Poland	UAV Capability	—	—	—	—	9.9	9.9
Romania	Equipment for Special Operations Forces (SOF) participating in ISAF					11.1	11.1
Ukraine	CT Capability Aid	—	12.0	—	—	—	12.0
Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine	Counter-IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) Training for units scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan	—	—	—	—	2.8	2.8
Total Greater Europe		—	28.2	16.8	0	74.0*	119.0*
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Including Central Asia)							

Recipient(s)	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Totals
Indonesia	Integrated Maritime Surveillance System	18.4	—	—	—	—	80.0
	Eastern Fleet Regional Command Center	—	3.8	—	—	—	
	Eastern Fleet Maritime Equipment	—	7.3	—	—	—	
	Celebes Sea and Malacca Strait Network	—	6.1	—	—	—	
	Coastal Surveillance Stations	—	11.5	4.3	—	—	
	Western Fleet Command and Control (C2) Center and HQ	—	—	2.0	—	—	
	Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Surveillance and Reconnaissance	—	—	4.0	—	—	
	Maritime SOF CT	—	—	—	—	10.8	
	Aviation CT Interdiction	—	—	—	—	11.8	
Kazakhstan	Coalition CT and Stability Operations Capacity Aid	—	19.3	—	—	—	31.8
	Caspian Security	—	—	12.5	—	—	
Kyrgyzstan	Increasing Armed Forces CT Capabilities	—	—	11.6	—	—	21.2
	CT Forces Support	—	—	—	9.6	—	
Malaysia	Eastern Sabah MDA Radars	—	13.6	—	—	—	43.8
	Strait of Malacca MDA Support	—	2.2	—	—	—	
	MDA Package	—	—	11.5	—	—	
	CENTRIX Stations	—	0.5	—	—	—	
	C2 Center for Joint Forces Sabah HQ	—	—	7.1	—	—	
	Maritime Interdiction Package	—	—	9.0	—	—	
Maldives	SOF CT and Intelligence	—	—	—	—	3.9	3.9
Philippines	Maritime T&E for Interdiction Purposes	—	3.0	—	—	—	82.8
	Coast Watch South High Frequency Radios (FY07)/ Radars for Sulu	—	1.8	11.1	—	—	

Recipient(s)	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Totals
	Archipelago (FY08)						
	Maritime Interdiction Capability	—	6.4	—	—	—	
	Interdiction and Offensive Capabilities Improvement (of UH-1 Huey helicopters)	—	4.4	—	—	—	
	Border Control Interdiction	—	—	5.8	—	—	
	Coast Watch South (CWS) Radars for Eastern Mindanao and adjacent border surveillance	—	—	—	14.5	—	
	CWS Intelligence – Operations CT Capability	—	—	—	8.1	—	
	Precision Guided Missile Capability to Conduct CT Operations	—	—	—	—	18.4	
	Marine Strike Capability	—	—	—	—	9.3	
Sri Lanka	Maritime Security T&E for Interdiction Purposes	10.8	—	—	—	—	18.2
	Aircraft C2 Integration	—	6.0	—	—	—	
	Maritime Security and Navy Interdiction Capability	—	1.4	—	—	—	
Total Asia and the Pacific		29.2	87.3	78.9	32.2	54.1	281.7
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH/SOUTHWESTERN ASIA							
Azerbaijan	Naval Commando CT Training	—	—	1.7	—	—	1.7
Bahrain	Patrol Boats (Value of equipment redirected from cancelled Thailand program)	5.3	—	—	—	—	50.3
	Coastal Patrol Capability Development	—	24.6	—	—	—	
	Defense Force Counterintelligence Analysis Center Development	—	0.04	—	—	—	
	Defense Force Special Operations T&E	—	—	4.3	—	—	
	Coastal Surveillance System Upgrade	—	—	—	16.1	—	
Bangladesh	Maritime Patrol and Interdiction Initiative	—	—	7.2	—	—	22.7
	Naval Special Forces CT	—	—	—	8.5	—	

Recipient(s)	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Totals
	T&E						
	Maritime CT	—	—	—	—	7.0	
Lebanon	Military Assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces	10.5	30.6	—	—	—	128.5
	SOF T&E	—	—	7.2	—	—	
	Secure Communications for SOF	—	—	7.9	—	—	
	Urban Soldier Equipment	—	—	—	21.5	—	
	Cessna Caravan	—	—	—	27.8	—	
	SOF T&E	—	—	—	—	23.0	
Pakistan	Border Area T&E/ Marines T&E	23.3	5.7	—	—	—	203.4
	Enhance Shared MDA and Cooperative Maritime Security Aid	—	8.1	—	—	—	
	Helicopter CT Capability	—	—	20.9	—	—	
	Special Services Group COIN Kick Start Initiative	—	—	14.9	—	—	
	Mi-17 Support	—	—	17.0	—	—	
	Mi-17 Helicopters	—	—	—	80.0	—	
	Aviation Maintenance Shelters in Federally Administered Tribal Areas	—	—	—	3.1	—	
	Army and Navy Capability Building to Investigate Explosives	—	—	—	0.6	—	
	SOF CT Package	—	—	—	17.0	—	
	Ground-Based Intelligence S&R Capability	—	—	—	12.8	—	
Yemen	Cross Border Security and CT Aid	4.3	—	—	—	—	252.6
	Yemeni Special Operations Capacity Development to Enhance Border Security	—	26.0	—	—	—	
	Air Force Aerial Surveillance Initiative	—	—	—	5.9	—	
	Coast Guard Maritime Security Initiative	—	—	—	29.9	—	
	Increased Border Security CT Initiative	—	—	—	25.4	—	
	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Initiative	—	—	—	5.8	—	

Recipient(s)	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Totals
	SOF CT Enhancement Package	—	—	—	—	34.5	
	Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Support for Yemeni Air Force to Support CT Units	—	—	—		38.0	
	Rotary-Wing Aircraft and Support for Yemeni Air Force to Support CT Units, and Upgrades and Parts for approx. 10 existing Yemeni Air Force Helicopters					82.8	
Total Middle East and South Asia		43.4	95.0	81.1	254.4	185.3	659.2
WESTERN HEMISPHERE							
Mexico	CT Capabilities (FY07)/ CT Capability Package (FY08)	—	1.0	12.9	—	—	13.9
Dominican Republic and Panama	Joint Maritime CT Capability Aid	14.4	—	—	—	—	14.4
Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua	Caribbean Basin Maritime Security Aid (radios and boats)	—	23.4	—	—	—	23.4
Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama	Caribbean Basin Capability Enhancements	—	—	11.1	—	—	11.1
Belize, Guyana, Honduras, and Suriname	CT Unit T&E for participation in Operation Enduring Freedom	—	—	9.3	—	—	9.3
Total Western Hemisphere		14.4	24.4	33.3	—	—	72.1
Additional Transportation Expenses for items obligated during FY06-FY08 but delivered later.		—	—	—	3.1	—	3.1
Totals		100.0	273.6	272.4	339.9	340.6	1326.5

Source: Based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, FY2006-FY2009 allocations provided October 13, 2009. In one case, as noted, the figure is the amount notified to Congress. FY2010 figures are congressional notifications provided February 9, 2011.

Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding, and in the case of Greater Europe FY2010 funding, due to the early re-notification of parts of Estonia and Georgia funding for Bulgaria. Because all other FY2010 numbers represent congressional notifications rather than allocations, the Estonia and Georgia numbers were kept as notifications for consistency.

Appendix. Evolution of Section 1206 Legislation: 2005-2010

The George W. Bush Administration's proposed National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 contained a provision for a new partnership capacity-building authority. As submitted to Congress, the DOD-proposed authorization legislation differed in several important respects from the "Section 1206" legislation that was eventually passed.

DOD's proposed authorization bill would have vested new authority with the President to "authorize building the capacity of partner nations' military or security forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or participate in or support United States, coalition, or international military or stability operations." The proposed legislation provided the Secretary of Defense the lead on implementation, but gave a veto power to the Secretary of State: "The Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, implement partnership security capacity building...." DOD could implement capacity building projects on its own, or by transferring DOD funds to the Department of State or to any other federal agency. The presidential and agency roles changed in subsequent versions.

DOD's proposed authorization language would have allowed assistance to build up foreign military and security forces for purposes similar to but more specific than those ultimately enacted into law (Section 1206, P.L. 109-163). The types of forces that could be assisted were much broader, and included "armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police forces." The proposed annual cap on such assistance was \$750 million, much greater than that eventually approved.

DOD's proposed appropriations language would have provided for the appropriation of up to \$750 million of funds from operations and maintenance accounts to provide assistance to military or security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provide assistance to other military forces in friendly nations in the nearby region to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and to support U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense could use those funds only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

Congressional Action in 2005

Congressional action in 2005 on the DOD proposals started with Senate approval of a floor amendment to the Senate version of the FY2006 NDAA (S. 1042). The legislation that emerged from conference committee action on the conference version of the bill (H.R. 1815) and was signed into law on January 6, 2006 (P.L. 109-163) differed significantly from the DOD proposals.

Not one of the armed services or appropriations committees included the DOD proposals for a global train and equip authority or appropriation in legislation they reported that year. Congressional action began when Senator Inhofe introduced a modified version of the DOD authorization proposal as a floor amendment (S.Amdt. 2432) to S. 1042. On November 8, 2005, the Senate approved an amended version of that amendment, supported by Senator Lugar. Both would provide authority for the purposes requested by DOD. Each version of the Inhofe amendment progressively strengthened the State Department role compared to the DOD proposal. Conference committee negotiators made further changes, however, strengthening the DOD role,

diminishing the State Department role, restricting the types of forces that could be supported, and lowering the funding cap.

The Inhofe amendment introduced on November 4, 2005, was similar to the DOD authorization request in that it would have conferred authority on the President to build partnership security capacity of foreign military and security forces on the President and authorized the use of up to \$750 million a year in DOD funds for the same purposes as the original DOD authorization request. A major difference was the role of the State Department. The Inhofe amendment made a request by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense the trigger to initiate DOD support, a seemingly stronger role than that of the DOD proposed legislation which required the Secretary of Defense to seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State for any support. Like the DOD proposal, however, the Inhofe amendment left DOD free to implement programs itself, or to transfer funds to the Department of State or any other federal agency for implementation. (These funds would remain available until expended.) In introducing the amendment, Senator Inhofe indicated that the purpose of the new authority was to expedite train and equip assistance, and expressed displeasure with then-current arrangements for train and equip programs conducted through the State Department. For instance, he noted that assistance to train and equip Georgia forces for counterterrorism required that "Seven different authorities for funding and sources ... be stitched together" in a process that took eight months.⁷³

The revised Inhofe amendment further strengthened the Secretary of State's role by making three changes. One change eliminated DOD's ability to implement proposals on its own. Another eliminated DOD's ability to transfer funds to any civilian agency other than the State Department. In short, the Secretary of Defense could provide partnership support *only* by transferring DOD funds to the Department of State. A third change made such support subject to the authorities and limitations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the FY2006 Foreign Operations bill.

In a November 8, 2006 floor statement, Senator Lugar stated that "the amendment as now written leaves the authority for deciding which countries, and when, how, and why foreign assistance should be provided, in the hands of the Secretary of State. The amendment does not provide statutory authority to the Secretary of Defense to establish a new foreign aid program outside the purview of the Secretary of State. It does authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide funding to the State Department for a new train and equip foreign assistance program..."⁷⁴ At the same time, Senator Lugar acknowledged DOD concerns that the "State Department oversight of these kinds of programs [is] cumbersome and slow." He stated: "These obstacles need to be overcome. State Department procedures should be streamlined and the two Departments should develop plans to push these important programs forward efficiently and quickly." (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.)

⁷³ Senator James Inhofe, Senate, *Congressional Record*, daily edition, November 4, 2005, p. S12395.

⁷⁴ Senator Lugar further stated that "The Secretary of State should retain full authority over decisions as to which countries should receive assistance, the timing of its provision, and the way in which it should be provided. The Department of Defense should continue implementing train and equip programs under the purview of the Secretary of State." He concluded: "All foreign assistance programs need to take place within a foreign policy context, with consideration of the traditional concerns—the recipient country's treatment of its own people, potential reactions from neighboring states in the region, and the overall bilateral relationship with the recipient country, including the assistance in the war against terrorism. It is the Secretary of State's job to weigh such foreign policy issues and make recommendations to the President that strike the right balance for American interests. The amendment as now written meets the concerns I had and I would request that I be listed as a co-sponsor." (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.)

A distinct final version, as mentioned above, emerged from the conference committee. There were four important changes from the Senate version. First, the conference committee version of H.R. 1815 stripped the leadership role from the Secretary of State and bestowed it on the Secretary of Defense. Section 1206 broadened DOD's role by providing authority for the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign military forces. It reduced the Secretary of State's role by providing that the Secretaries of Defense and State were to "jointly formulate any program directed by the President" and the Secretary of Defense was to "coordinate with the Secretary of State in the implementation of any program directed by the President...." Second, the conference committee version did not provide authority to assist security forces of any type. Third, it lowered the annual funding cap considerably, to \$200 million. And fourth, it broadened the purpose of the counterterrorism element of the assistance from enabling foreign forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks and to close safe havens to enabling them to conduct counterterrorist operations.

In their explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-360, accompanying H.R. 1815), the conferees described Section 1206 as a two-year pilot program, which would be reviewed at the end of that period. They noted that "under current law, foreign military training programs are conducted exclusively under the authority of the Secretary of State." The conferees signaled the importance of ensuring that any changes in statutory authorities for foreign military assistance do not have unintended consequences for the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large, nor detract from DOD's focus on core responsibilities, particularly warfighting tasks.

Congressional Action for FY2006-FY2009

Congress made further changes to Section 1206 authority through amendments in subsequent NDAA's. Most important among them was the 2007 modification elevating the State Department's role while, at the same time, vesting authority for the program in the Secretary of Defense. Section 1206 of the John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) amended Section 1206 by eliminating the President's role in directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support such programs. Instead, it authorized "the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State" to conduct or support those programs. Other changes in that legislation raised the authorized amount to \$300 million, and it extended the authority through FY2008.⁷⁵

This amendment was the result of a conference committee compromise over a proposed Senate amendment that would have extended Section 1206 authority to combatant commanders. In their explanatory statement, the conferees stated that "the authorities provided in this section are provided in the spirit of a pilot program.... The conferees believe it will be important to demonstrate through experience that these expanded authorities can and will be exercised consistent with the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large. Furthermore, the

⁷⁵ The DOD proposal for FY2007 NDAA authorization language had requested that authority to direct Section 1206 programs be vested in the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, rather than the President, in order to "increase responsiveness by relieving the President of having to approve each Section 1206 program personally, while preserving important roles of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in authorizing capacity-building programs under this provision. This would enable the Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to pursue time-sensitive opportunities to build capacity of partner nations." DOD also requested the expansion of the types of forces that could be assisted to include security forces ("specifically gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, border protection, and counterterrorism forces ..."), and an increase in the spending cap to \$750 million.

conferees strongly believe that foreign assistance programs are more appropriately funded through the foreign assistance accounts, as administered by the Department of State, and urge the administration to request sufficient funding for foreign military assistance in those accounts in future years budget requests.”⁷⁶

For FY2008, Congress appropriated \$300 million for Section 1206 in the DOD Appropriations Act, 2008 (also known as the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, P.L. 110-116).

In 2008, the Bush Administration requested that Section 1206 authority be made permanent law under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the *United States Code*. It also asked that spending authority be increased to \$750 million, but in its FY2009 budget request asked for \$500 million in appropriations for that year. Congress denied the Bush Administration’s requests. Instead, through the enactment of the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress extended Section 1206 temporary authority for three years (i.e., through FY2011). P.L. 110-417 also expanded Section 1206 authority to include the provision of assistance to maritime security forces,⁷⁷ and raised the spending cap to \$350 million. In the same bill, Congress also provided authority for funds to be used in consecutive fiscal years (i.e., funds made available for a program begun in one fiscal year may also be used for that program in the next fiscal year).

In their respective reports on the FY2009 NDAA, both the House and the Senate armed services committees expressed concern about whether Section 1206 funds were being appropriately used.

- The Senate Armed Services Committee report reiterated the committee’s earlier position that Section 1206 was intended as a pilot program, “not intended to duplicate or substitute for other foreign assistance authorities, nor ... intended to sustain train and equip programs over multiple years.” It expressed the committee’s concerns that Section 1206 funds were “being used for programs, particularly in countries where the terrorist threat is currently low, that primarily serve to build counter-narcotics capabilities.”⁷⁸

⁷⁶ These changes were the result of a conference committee compromise on a Senate amendment to Section 1206 in S. 2766, its version of the FY2007 NDAA. See H.Rept. 109-702, the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5152.

The Senate amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to authorize commanders of the geographic combatant commands “to respond to unanticipated changes in a security environment” within their area of responsibility (AOR) to spend up to \$50 million per year per commander for Section 1206 purposes, with total spending limited to \$200 million. In addition, the Senate Amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense to authorize geographic combatant commanders “to respond to urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief or reconstruction requirements in a foreign country within the commander’s AOR” if the commander determined that such assistance would promote the security interest of the United States and the recipient country, up to a total of \$200 million “in any country in a fiscal year.” In response, the House, which had no similar provision, offered the amendment which was adopted. Although the proposed section to provide combatant commanders with funding for existing Section 1206 purposes was deleted, elsewhere in the bill the conferees included a provision to expand authority under the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund to provide urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.

⁷⁷ As passed by the Senate, S. 3001 would have extended Section 1206 authority to security forces, specifically “a foreign country’s coast guard, border protection, and other security forces engaged primarily in counterterrorism missions in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations.” The Administration had requested authority to train and equip a wide spectrum of security forces, including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces.

⁷⁸ S.Rept. 110-335 continued: “While recognizing a degree of overlap between counterterrorism and counternarcotics capabilities, the committee urges the Department of Defense to fund programs to build counter-narcotics capabilities using funds and authorities intended to support counter-narcotics activities, and if appropriate, seek any necessary (continued...)”

- The House Armed Services Committee report stated DOD had “pushed beyond the clearly articulated limits of this authority” in the case of Panama, raising concern “about the responsible execution of this authority in the future.” In the report, the committee expressed its belief “that capable foreign partners play a vital role in the international security environment but remain unconvinced that this authority should reside permanently with the Department of Defense. The committee expects that, over the long-term, these ‘train and equip’-type authorities, which appear to be migrating to the Department of Defense, might better remain within the Department of State’s jurisdiction.”⁷⁹

Congressional Action for FY2010

DOD Appropriations Action

The FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326) contained the full Obama Administration request of \$345 million, despite House appropriations action to cut that amount. As reported by the House Appropriations Committee (July 16, 2009, H.Rept. 111-230) and passed by the House (July 22, 2009), the House version of the DOD appropriations act would have appropriated \$195 million for Section 1206 funding. The Senate Appropriations Committee version (reported September 10, 2009, S.Rept. 111-74) approved the full \$345 million requested by the Obama Administration; no change was made by the Senate in approving the bill on October 6, 2009. As signed into law on December 19, 2009, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-118), contains \$345 million for Section 1206 Global Train and Equip programs. (The amount is not specified in the act itself but is included under the total appropriated to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the Operations and Maintenance [O&M] Defense-wide budget.)

DOD Authorization Action

In action on the proposed FY2010 NDAA (H.R. 2647/S. 1390), HASC set forth its evolving views on whether Congress should move Section 1206 authority from DOD to the State Department and SASC proposed new stipulations on Section 1206 use. As signed into law in October 2009 (P.L. 111-34), the FY2010 NDAA retains the \$350 authorized funding level but introduces a new funding provision by specifying that up to \$75 million could be used to train the military troops of coalition partners in each FY2010 and FY2011.

As marked up by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on June 10, and reported to the House on June 18 (H.R. 2647), the FY2010 NDAA would have authorized \$350 million for Section 1206, according to the HASC press release. The committee report accompanying the bill (H.Rept. 111-166) noted an evolution of the HASC position on Section 1206 funding.

(...continued)

modifications to existing counter-narcotics authorities to support these activities.” The committee also indicated that it viewed U.S. Africa Command AOR counterterrorism needs as a priority for Section 1206 assistance.

⁷⁹ H.Rept. 110-652 also encouraged DOD “to use members of the United States military to conduct the training provided under this authority whenever possible.”

In discussing Section 1206, HASC stated that while it previously had regarded Section 1206 "as part of the foreign assistance family of authorities that has traditionally resided within the Department of State's purview" in order to assist foreign countries meet their own security needs as part of a U.S. foreign policy framework, it now views Section 1206 as a "new type of authority" to meet a perceived need "to build certain capacities in partner nations to satisfy specific theater security requirements." (p. 411) While not discounting the idea that the authority might better be placed at the Department of State than at DOD, HASC reflects that wherever the authority ultimately lies, the need for projects responding to a DOD-led assessment of U.S. national security needs means that the "Secretary of Defense must play a primary role in generating requirements." (p 412)

As reported July 2, 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the FY2011 NDAA (S. 1390) would have permitted the use of up to \$75 million (of the total \$350 authorized for Section 1206) on programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed forces are a participant. This limitation would pertain to programs that begin on or after October 1, 2009, and be effective for FY2010 and FY2011. Previously, there was no specification regarding the amount that could be spent for either of Section 1206's two stated purpose. (As noted elsewhere, little funding had been spent through FY2009 on building capacity other than counterterrorism capacity.)

As described in the SASC report (S.Rept. 111-35), this limitation was made in response to DOD's request for new authorities to build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces preparing to support a coalition operation conducted as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, or by the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and to build the capacity of NATO and partner SOF to support NATO or coalition special operations conducted as part of OIF or OEF in Afghanistan, or by the NATO ISAF.

SASC stated that "both these activities can be conducted within the existing authority of section 1206" and that the committee "would be open to considering proposals to use the authority under this section to help build the capacity of NATO and other coalition partners whose ability to contribute to ongoing military or stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would otherwise be limited." Nevertheless, SASC explains the cap as a means to ensure that Section 1206 funding serves its intended purpose (i.e., to provide a means to address emerging needs) and not as substitute for security assistance under the State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority. As expressed in the report accompanying its bill, DOD's "stated desire to conduct sustained capacity building to prepare special operations to deploy for coalition operations suggests that it intends to establish multi-year programs with respect to certain recipient countries." The \$75 million limit is intended to reduce "the potential impact of such multi-year programs on the section 1206 program as a whole."

The SASC report emphasized the temporary nature of Section 1206 authority. It also urged the Obama Administration to review existing DOD and State Department security assistance authorities in order "to reconcile, de-conflict, and improve the effectiveness of these authorities."

As signed into law on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84), the FY2010 NDAA put in place a temporary \$75 million limit for FY2010 and FY2011 on Section 1206 funds used to train military troops of coalition partners to participate in or support military and stability operations.

Foreign Relations Authorization Action

Congressional concerns regarding the appropriate agency to exercise responsibility for security assistance programs emerged in House action on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010-FY2011 (H.R. 2410). In that bill, the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed a new "Security Assistance Contingency Fund" for the State Department with purposes that would overlap with Section 1206. The House passed H.R. 2410 with that proposal intact in June 2009. No Senate action occurred on H.R. 2410, received by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) on June 22, 2009. No corresponding Senate bill was introduced.

H.R. 2410, Section 841, as reported to the House on June 4 (H.Rept. 111-136) and passed by the House on June 10, would authorize the Secretary of State "to conduct a program to respond to contingencies in foreign countries or regions by providing training, procurement, and capacity-building of a foreign country's military forces and dedicated counterterrorism forces in order for that country to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations; or (2) participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United States is a participant." Section 841 would authorize the appropriation of \$25 million in each FY2010 and FY2011 for these purposes, as well as the use of up to \$25 million in Foreign Military Financing funds in each of those fiscal years for the same purposes. Funds would remain available until expended.

Like Section 1206, this authority could not be used to provide any type of assistance otherwise prohibited by law nor used to assist any foreign country otherwise prohibited from receiving such type of assistance under any provision of law. Unlike Section 1206, this authority would be exercised by the Secretary of State, with the only coordination requirement being that the Secretary "shall consult with the head of any other appropriate department or agency in the formulation and execution" of programs conducted under this authority. Section 841 would require a 15-day notification to congressional foreign affairs and appropriations committees before funds are obligated.

The 111th Congress took no further action on this bill.

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